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Abstract
In this paper, we argue that difﬁculties in the deﬁnition of coreference it-
self contribute to lower inter-annotator agreement in certain cases. Data from
a large referentially annotated corpus serves to corroborate this point, using a
quantitative investigation to assess which effects or problems are likely to be
the most prominent. Several examples where such problems occur are dis-
cussed in more detail, and we then propose a generalisation of Poesio, Reyle
and Stevenson’s Justiﬁed Sloppiness Hypothesis to provide a uniﬁed model
for these cases of disagreement and argue that a deeper understanding of the
phenomena involved allows to tackle problematic cases in a more principled
fashion than would be possible using only pre-theoretic intuitions.
1 Introduction
Since the early investigations by Hirschman et al. (1997) and the critique of the
MUC-7 annotation scheme put forward by van Deemter and Kibble (2000), several
large corpora have been annotated with coreference relations, with reﬁnements in
terms of annotation schemes (Poesio, 2004), as well as in terms of support by the
annotation tools.
Creating large annotated corpora like the ACE corpus1, the Dutch KNACK-
2002 corpus (Hoste and Daelemans, 2004), or the referential layer of the German
T¨ uBa-D/Z treebank (Hinrichs et al., 2005) entails a signiﬁcant cost in terms of
the man-power needed both for the annotation and for the development of anno-
tation guidelines and, possibly, annotation tools. This cost is usually justiﬁed by
data-driven development of systems that automatically do coreference resolution:
a vast majority of the systems that are now considered state of the art (Luo et al.,
2004, Uryupina, 2006, inter alia) use models that are automatically learned from a
corpus.
∗InMassimoPoesioandRonArtstein(eds.): AmbiguityinAnaphora. SpecialIssueoftheJournal
on Research on Language and Computation, to appear.
1http://projects.ldc.upenn.edu/ace/
1Looking at a neighbouring ﬁeld, we see that annotated corpora can remain use-
ful for a very long time, even when the framework used for building the systems
varies considerably: the Penn Treebank has been in use for the data-driven build-
ing of parsers for quite a long time, from (Magerman, 1995) to recent approaches
like (Charniak and Johnson, 2005), who use different features and get qualitatively
better results. There is even research that uses the Penn Treebank data to induce
probabilistic grammars that yield linguistically richer structures than directly avail-
able in the Penn Treebank (Hockenmaier and Steedman, 2002; Cahill et al., 2002;
Miyao and Tsujii, 2005).
But data-driven system development is not the only use of annotated corpora,
and nor should it be. Annotated corpora can be very useful for corpus linguis-
tic research, as well as a source of examples for research that normally tends to
rely on introspection. Especially the investigation of rare phenomena can proﬁt
from annotated corpora since it is easier to pinpoint possible occurrences than with
approximate queries in unannotated corpora (Meurers, 2005).
The quality of corpus annotation is important both for data-driven systems
development and for corpus-linguistic research: for data-driven systems develop-
ment, repeatability (or consistency) of annotation obviously yields an upper limit
to what an automatic system can do; and even when machine learning approaches
can cope with noisy data quite well, they do better when less additional noise is
present. Dickinson and Meurers (2005) show that parsing performance improves
visibly when using a corrected version of the Penn Treebank for training. Corpus
linguists do also proﬁt from high annotation quality, since incorrectly annotated
data leads to more spurious matches as well as potentially interesting items that are
overlooked because they are annotated incorrectly.
In the following section, we will give an overview of common methods for
assessing annotation quality, explain the notion of referential ambiguities as anno-
tation problems arising from a mismatch between annotation model and the text
meaning it is meant to model. We try to shed some light on potentially prob-
lematic issues in coreference resolution by outlining some criteria where we think
coreference annotation is less problematic, namely the resolution of (pronominal)
anaphora to textual antecedents, which is linguistically well understood, and the
tracking of entities coming from a ﬁxed frame of reference (named entity tracking),
where reference relations are ontologically well-founded; whereas coreference an-
notation also encompasses other phenomena that are less well-founded and that
should be subject to more research.
In section 3, we will make the case that referential ambiguities exist not only
in spontaneous dialogue such as in the corpus examined by Poesio and Artstein
(2005), butalsoinlargereferentiallyannotatedcorporaofwrittenlanguage, suchas
T¨ uBa-D/Z. Using a quantitative analysis, we will also argue that there is a marked
difference in the achieved consistency between annotation that fulﬁlls the criteria
outlined earlier, which can be annotated very consistently, and annotation where
these criteria are not met. We will then analyse some examples where problems
arise from these assumptions not being met in more detail, in section 4, and, ﬁ-
2nally, in section 5, come back to the question of how to treat referential ambiguity,
comparing the merits of several proposed solutions.
2 Annotation Quality
There are two criteria that are important when assessing a given annotation: One
is that the annotation makes explicit some meaning that is inherent in the data but
would be hard to get at otherwise. Although this criterion is very important (it is
the reason to do annotation in the ﬁrst place), meaning is something that is often
hard to pin down, and in this respect the (often pre-theoretic) formalisation that is
done for the purpose of creating annotation guidelines is no different from other
formalisation attempts in the framework of particular theories.
The other criterion, which is more easily veriﬁed, is repeatability, or consis-
tency of annotations. This means that someone who knows the guidelines will be
able to predict the annotation for a certain phenomenon he or she has in mind; this
is important both for corpus linguistic purposes, where we want to search for a par-
ticular phenomenon, and for the use in data-driven systems development, where
the prediction is to be made automatically and inconsistencies in the annotation
limit its usefulness for evaluation and/or model induction purposes.
For coreference annotation or any other annotation task that includes complex
structure, one does well to take this complexity into account when designing the
workﬂow leading to the ﬁnal annotated corpus. In a pilot study on the annotation
of temporal relations in texts, Setzer and Gaizauskas (2001) found that several
sources of errors for the process of identifying temporal relations between events
were related to the complexity of the task: lack of understanding of the guidelines
on the part of the annotators (maybe due to insufﬁcient training), fatigue due to
the monotony of (parts of) the annotation task or simply carelessness on the part
of annotators. These factors make it obvious that with increasing complexity of
the annotation task, both extensive training of annotators and good tool support is
necessary, but also that a subsequent revision step should be considered a regular
part of the annotation process.
Simple mistakes on the part of annotators can be later found and corrected,
either by a process of careful cross-checking of annotations (often by a more expe-
rienced person), or from error reports by users of the annotated corpus; these can
then be veriﬁed against the annotation guidelines and eventually the annotation will
converge towards a state where it is virtually free of mistakes.
This is different from cases that are not decidable on the basis of the annotation
guidelines and the text at hand, where there is (as Setzer and Gaizauskas call it) an
“intrinsic difﬁculty” in determining the correct annotation, due to genuine ambi-
guities. In the presence of such ambiguities, it is usually difﬁcult to argue which
of the alternatives would be correct; moreover, Poesio and Artstein (2005) found
that some ambiguities were not even perceived as such when annotators were told
to explicitly mark them, which means that a subsequent process of revision may
3or may not converge to a stable point, and that users of the annotated corpus may
not ﬁnd what they expect and, even in full knowledge of annotation guidelines,
consider these annotations to be erroneous.
Some ambiguities, which Knees (2006) calls structural ambiguities, only per-
tain to non-essential information that does not contribute to the meaning conveyed
by the annotation, for example the exact text spans of markable in referential or
discourse annotation. It is not only possible, but also desirable to eliminate these
ambiguities by arbitrarily preferring one solution over the other and ﬁxing this in
the annotation guidelines (for example, always taking the largest possible or the
smallest possible span for a markable).
In cases where categories posited by the annotation scheme overlap, other
structural ambiguities arise, for example between unique descriptions that can be
interpreted out of context (called autonome in the coreference scheme of Gardent
and Manu´ elian, 2005) and discourse-old descriptions (called cor´ eferentielles in
their scheme). In cases where a discourse-old unique description is mentioned,
Gardent and Manu´ elian specify that the unique description label is to take prece-
dence. Chiarcos and Krasavina (2005) also make extensive use of such precedence
rules to eliminate most cases of structural ambiguity.
The other cases, subsumed by Knees under the label referential ambiguities,
do pertain to information that is essential to the annotation purpose, and one has to
be very careful in crafting annotation guidelines that will both ensure reasonably
consistent annotation and also minimise the distortion of the relation between the
annotation and its intended meaning, including generalisations and/or predictions
that may be only implicit in the annotation scheme.
2.1 Quantitative measures of Annotation quality
The most commonly used method to assess the quality of annotation is to let sev-
eral annotators independently annotate the same text(s), thus providing evidence
for the repeatability of the annotation task (or lack thereof). Since the real annota-
tion process includes an additional step with a more experienced expert correcting
many of simple mistakes (whereas ambiguities would still persist), such agreement
studies provide some indications of the ﬁnal quality, but should by no means be
considered as predictive for the ﬁnal quality of the annotation.2
For the quantitative analysis of agreement data, it is usual to use some statistic
that is monotonic with agreement (i.e., gives a number that increases when more
cases are agreed upon) and lies in a range that is independent of document/corpus
size and possibly other incidental properties of the annotated subcorpus.
The simplest statistic, percent agreement (i.e. number of cases agreed upon
2An example for this comes the SALSA corpus (Burchardt et al., 2006), where FrameNet anno-
tations are added to a treebank: in addition to inter-annotator agreement, they calculate agreement
between adjudicators, who create consensus for about 80% of the disagreements. Instead of the 20%
of cases where the original annotators did not agree, adjudication thus leaves about 4% that are truly
difﬁcult cases.
4divided by total number of cases) has two obvious problems: First, it is not readily
applicable to annotation that goes beyond assigning a category to single items.
Second, it is sensitive to frequency bias in that a single large class can make raw
agreement artiﬁcially high (consider two psychologists judging 10% of a sample as
mentally ill and agreeing on 90% of the - mainly non-ill - cases purely by chance).
The latter problem, uneven distribution of classes, has been approached with
two different solutions. The ﬁrst, traditionally used in the social sciences and
popularised for quantitative agreement studies in linguistic annotation by Carletta
(1996), are chance-corrected agreement measures such as the kappa coefﬁcient in-
troduced by Cohen (1960).
Assuming two annotators X and Y , we call pxy the probability that something
is marked by both X and Y , pxy the probability that something is marked by X, but
not by Y , etc., the observed percent agreement would be Ao := pxy+pxy, whereas
theagreement expectedfor randomannotationwould beAe := pxpy+pxpy (where
px is the probability that something is marked by X). The kappa coefﬁcient maps
the range from expected (Ae) to perfect (100%) agreement to the interval [0,1]:
κ =
Ao − Ae
1 − Ae
The other solution, F-measure, also called positive speciﬁc agreement, comes
from Information Retrieval (van Rijsbergen, 1979) and works well when one class
(relevant documents) is much smaller than the other class (irrelevant ones). Focus-
ing only on the minority class of positive instances, it is possible to say how many
positive instances are agreed upon as a fraction of the total positive instances for
one annotator, which we will call P =
pxy
px and R =
pxy
py .3 Taking the harmonic
mean of these proportions, we get
F =
2PR
P + R
=
2pxy
px + py
Vilain et al. (1995) have proposed a model-theoretic adaptation of F that ex-
tends the related concepts to partitionings. Based on Vilain et al.’s model, Pas-
sonneau (1997) proposes a kappa agreement measure by considering absent links
between entities (or entity groups) as negative class instances and computing an
expectation for the joint agreement probability on positive and negative cases.
2.2 Deﬁning Coreference
In the time since McCarthy and Lehnert (1995) argued for the utility of coreference
classiﬁcationininformationextraction(whichwas, andpartlystillis, dominatedby
3Assuming random annotation, we would get P =
pxy
px = py by independence assumption, and
random agreement would be close to zero if py (and for the converse case, px) are, i.e., if the positive
class is small. While originally conceived as an evaluation measure and not as an agreement measure,
some researchers recommend to use F alongside κ (Cicchetti and Feinstein, 1990), or in cases where
the size of the negative class is very large (Hripcsak and Rothschild, 2005).
5more shallow processing and for the most part avoids relying on richer linguistical
representations), and formal annotation guidelines were drafted for the MUC-6
coreference task (MUC6, 1995), the understanding of coreference annotation has
been greatly improved by criticisms based on theoretical consideration, and, on
the other hand, the theoretical understanding of the underlying mechanisms and
representations of coreference has beneﬁtted from the additional attention brought
by annotation and annotation problems.
The initial deﬁnition of coreference proposed for the MUC-6 coreference task
was very broad, also encompassing a few cases that would now be considered
identity-of-sense anaphora (the aluminium market → aluminium) and not coref-
erent in the proper sense. Furthermore, van Deemter and Kibble (2000) pointed
out that a number of problems exist with the MUC deﬁnitions: using the currently
assumed notion of reference with respect to the real world, quantiﬁed expressions
and pronouns that refer to them do not have a (unique, well-deﬁned) referent in
the real world, and should not be included in deﬁnitions of coreference. They also
point out problems with predicative constructions, where the predicate does is not
a referring expression, but is something that is predicted. (For example, in the sen-
tence “The stock price rose from $4.56 to $5.02”, both prices are something that
is predicted, but neither is coreferent with the NP “the stock price” in the stricter
sense).
Van Deemter and Kibble also point out that coreference, seen as a relation
from textual entities to entities in the world as in the MUC guidelines, becomes
problematic for quantiﬁed expression (like “every student who eats a big Kahuna
burger enjoys it”), since the quantiﬁed NP does not refer to a single referent (and
nor does the pronoun, which is clearly anaphoric).
Karttunen (1976), on the other hand, starts with the idea of coindexation that is
used in binding theory and proposes to extend this to pronominal anaphora gener-
ally and demonstrates some rules that govern the interaction between pronominal
reference on one hand and quantiﬁcation or modal embedding on the other. For
example, in “Peter wants to buy a new car. It would have to be red.”, the anaphoric
description ‘it’ is perfectly acceptable and there is no problem resolving it to its an-
tecedent, even when there is no actual real-world car involved. Most existing theo-
ries of discourse such as (S)DRT (Asher and Lascarides, 2003) assume anaphoric
reference to happen as coindexation of entities in a model (discourse referents),
where the discourse referents in a dynamic logic setting are semantically not dif-
ferent from bound variables in logical formulae when it comes to the representation
of anaphora bound by quantiﬁers.
Indeed, restricting ourselves to concrete real-world entities would imply that
anaphora annotation in biomedical texts be all but meaningless, since there, the
relation between textual entities and real-world entities is not at all straightforward.
But consider the following example (taken from Casta˜ no et al., 2002):
(1) We quantitatively analyzed the relationship between the structure and in-
hibiting activity of these substances toward [acetylcholinesterase and bu-
6tyryl cholinesterase]. Hydrophobic interactions were found to be important
for the inhibition of [both enzymes] but are more pronounced in the case of
butyryl chlinesterase.
The NP “acetylcholinesterase” does not designate a concrete molecule (or chunk of
molecules)intheworldbutthetextmakesageneralpredictionaboutthementioned
enzymes. Nonetheless, the anaphoric reference by the NP “both enzymes” is not
at all problematic, since we have no problem of ﬁnding a textual antecedent.
Thus, we need to replace the concept of reference to entities in the real word
by something more adequate; a good ﬁrst approximation would be to speak of ref-
erence to entities in a mental model. Mental models can (potentially) be somewhat
idiosyncratic; biomedical texts nonetheless have precise reference properties be-
cause there is a frame of reference underlying them that is shared by all users of
the (sub)language at hand. More generally, we can predict that reference (and co-
reference) is unproblematic as long as it is textually unambiguous (as in the case
of pronominal anaphora, bound or not) or there is a common frame of reference
containing a discrete set of non-overlapping entities. The existence of such a frame
of reference is usually a precondition to the use of rigid designators (proper names,
but also other names such as the substance names in biochemical texts or medical
leaﬂets, which the GNOME annotation treats very similarly to proper names, cf.
Poesio, 2000), and it ensures that properties that are ascribed to the entity in one
piece of the text are compatible with descriptions in any other piece of the same
text (substitutability).
3 Quantitative Evidence for Problematic Cases
For the following analysis, we used cases of disagreements found in two portions
of the current release of the T¨ ubingen Treebank of Written German (T¨ uBa-D/Z,
Hinrichs et al., 2005) that have been annotated by multiple annotators. A ﬁrst por-
tion, totalling about 60 articles, was annotated by two annotators, and the second,
totalling about 80 articles, was annotated by three annotators. One annotator, who
annotated both portions, was a post-graduate student of computational linguistics.
The other three annotators were undergraduate students of computational or gen-
eral linguistics.
Inter-annotator agreement on coreference sets (as F-measure following Vilain
et al.’s scoring scheme) is at 0.83 for the ﬁrst portion, and varies between 0.82 and
0.84 for the second portion.4 If we automatically enforce the requirement to in-
clude all modiﬁers in the markable span using the existing syntactic annotation, we
get an improved inter-annotator agreement of F=0.85 (for the second portion, be-
tween 0.85 and 0.89). This is a visible improvement, but less than what Hirschman
4Hirschman et al. (1997) also give an agreement ﬁgure of F=0.83, but they counted the elements
of appositional constructions as two markables linked by a coreference relation while we count them
as a single markable. Because these additional links between appositions are trivial to annotate, the
agreement on the remaining relations is probably slightly better in T¨ uBa-D/Z than in MUC-7.
7type F κ
anaphoric 0.95 0.86
coref-NE 0.89 0.84
coref-nonNE 0.69 0.65
reﬂexive 0.72 0.58
relative 0.92 0.30
ALL 0.85 0.81
Table 1: Agreement by link type
et al. (1997) found in their study when they let annotators discuss and agree on
markables and their boundaries.
We used an adaptation of Passoneau’s (1997) scoring scheme5 that allows us
to get κ and F-based agreement measures for subsets of the coreference links to
assessthereliabilitynotonlyfortheannotationtaskasawhole, butforseveralparts
of the task that we think are different enough to be evaluated separately (see table
1). We split the markables according to (personal and demonstrative) pronouns
(anaphoric), full noun phrase coreference with a named antecedent (coref-NE),
full noun phrase coreference with a non-named antecedent (coref-nonNE), as well
as reﬂexive and relative pronouns.
The overall κ value is 0.81, which counts as good reliability in the ranges cited
byDiEugenioandGlass(2004). Paralleltothepredictionsmadeearlier, boththose
coreference links between pronominal anaphora and their antecedents (F = 0.96,
κ = 0.86) and coreference links to named entities (F = 0.89, κ = 0.84) can be
annotated very reliably, but coreference between arbitrary common nouns is some-
what problematic (F = 0.69, κ = 0.65). The annotation of reﬂexive pronouns
was subject to a requirement that non-referring reﬂexive pronouns (occurring with
so-called inherently reﬂexive verbs, which always require a reﬂexive pronoun as
object) are not to be annotated. The distinction between normal verbs with a re-
ﬂexive pronoun and inherently reﬂexive verbs seems to be somewhat problematic,
something which is reﬂected in lower F and κ scores. Relative pronouns can be
annotated quite reliably (as witnessed by the high F value), but since they always
have a referent and the distribution is very skewed towards annotating them, the κ
value does not reﬂect this. We see this latter effect as a ﬂaw in the kappa statistic
used rather than as a serious annotation problem.
In an earlier study, we classiﬁed every full NP mention in the ﬁrst portion
that any one of the two annotators had annotated as being coreferent with another
mention (including pronominal mentions) with a semantic class label using the
following categorization6:
5We derive a maximally consensual directed spanning tree of links and classify each markable as
agreeing(no-link), agreeing(same-antecedent) or disagreeing, then proceeding as proposed by Pas-
sonneau.
6The annotation of semantic classes was performed by the author of this paper. Zaenen et al.
(2004), whodidastudywith3annotatorsforaslightlyﬁnercodingscheme, foundthattheagreement
8• Persons(PER)arenaturalpersons, includingpluralpersonNPsusedmetony-
mously to denote some organization (the conservatives, the policemen).
• Organizations (ORG) are formal groupings of persons that are seen as a sin-
gle actor (e.g. political parties, sports clubs, research institutes)
• Events (EVT) have a (more or less well-deﬁned) temporal boundary and
often result in a change in the state of affairs (e.g. wars, ﬁnancial mergers,
strikes).
• Locations (LOC) are all geopolitical entities (countries, cities etc.) as well
as geographical and physical features.
• Objects (OBJ) are things that can be possessed and used. They may or may
not have a material form (as in bank accounts, or electronic books).
• Temporal entities (TMP) are regions of time that are referred to explicitly
(e.g. the next week, the eighth day of the strike, Christmas 2006).
• The rest (OTHER) is a mixture comprising abstract objects that we did not
want to distinguish further, including propositions, legal rights, plans etc.
Looking at the disagreement shown in table 2, we can see that there is sig-
niﬁcant interaction between disagreements and semantic classes (χ2 = 20.77,
p < 0.01), and between disagreements and number (χ2 = 4.76, p < 0.05). Single
persons, organizations and objects have the lowest error rates7, whereas plural ob-
jects and temporal entities (which only occured with singular number) exhibit an
unusually high error rate.
Several error types contribute to these discrepancies. We ﬁnd that many of the
errors for single locations and all of the errors for temporal mentions are indeed
simply mistakes and would possibly proﬁt highly from better annotation tools: in
these cases, the location or the temporal region is uniquely (and thus unambigu-
ously) speciﬁed, but since they are always uniquely speciﬁed, rather than being
anaphoric in the sense that context information from a speciﬁc antecedent was
needed for the interpretation. Additionally, keeping track of the temporal and spa-
tial locations in a story is usually not required, while keeping track of the protag-
onists of a story (usually persons and/or organizations) is required for its under-
standing. In three of the ﬁve erroneous coreference decisions regarding temporal
mentions, we found that, to realize the coreference relations between the mentions,
it would be necessary to make certain inferences that a cursory reader will almost
certainly not make. For plural objects, another source of disagreement is overrep-
resented, the ambiguity whether a given mention is used in a speciﬁc or in a generic
sense, typically when a class of objects is denoted. As a simpliﬁed example, the
they got for this task was quite good (κ = 0.92). Unfortunately, non-repeated noun phrase mentions
have not been annotated with semantic class information, which precludes the application of κ-based
measures of per-class agreement on the coreference annotation.
7We deﬁned the error rate as the ratio between the number of disagreements and the number of
markables that were coreferent to another markable in at least one annotator’s version.
9(total) (disagree) error rate
pl sg all pl sg all pl sg all
PER 156 297 453 33 25 58 0.21 0.08 0.13
ORG 38 310 348 8 39 47 0.21 0.13 0.14
LOC 12 204 217 1 41 42 0.08 0.20 0.19
EVT 31 165 196 5 42 47 0.16 0.26 0.24
OBJ 29 80 109 11 11 22 0.38 0.14 0.20
TMP — 14 14 — 5 5 — 0.36 0.36
OTHER 16 95 111 1 18 19 0.06 0.19 0.17
Table 2: Disagreements by semantic class and number
sentence “They want to make the freight trains faster” can have a speciﬁc reading
(where the trains get faster individually) and a generic one (where slow trains are
decommissioned and replaced by faster ones, such that the [average] speed of the
freight train ﬂeet increases, even though no train is actually made faster).
The disagreement in the PER class that were due to ambiguities mostly in-
volve groups of persons, which are not generic, but the actual set of persons that
they denote is vague, and annotators decided differently on the question whether
two vague objects corefer. Problems with vague reference are usually suspected
with event coreference, which is why general event coreference is usually excluded
from annotation schemes that are geared towards the reliable annotation of large
text quantities, but the presence of this problem for groups of persons (and organi-
zations) suggests that a principled treatment of vague reference would beneﬁt not
only the coreference annotation for nominalized events, but also that for groups of
persons, which are as important (disagreement-wise) as the former.
4 Instances of Referential Ambiguity
In the last section, we provided quantitative evidence to support our hypothesis that
coreference can be annotated very reliably as long as it is a textual phenomenon
(anaphora) or the mentions in the text refer to non-overlapping entities from a ﬁxed
frame of reference (named entity tracking), but can be problematic in other cases.
More speciﬁcally, we will examine the phenomena that arise when either the
entities are not discrete, but have a non-negligible problem of vagueness; when
the entities are well-deﬁned but there are multiple frames of reference; or, ﬁnally,
when mentions evoke (and possibly refer to) more than one entity, as can be the
case in polysemy and metonymy but also in other cases.
We use speciﬁc examples to examine some of these cases where the posited
criteria do not hold and investigate the nature of the resulting problems, possibly
making reference to speciﬁc theories of discourse for explanation.
104.1 Co-reference of Vague Entities
At least in newspaper text, it is a plausible assumption that people reading a text
will get a very similar view of the main events or propositions of said text, even
when annotating that text might uncover referential ambiguities. Our working hy-
pothesis would therefore be that referential ambiguities must be attributed to the
reference relation between mentions and pieces of modeled reality, as well as the
identity conditions between these pieces, which are both non-issues with concrete
referents, or some referents like mountains that have vague boundaries but can be
individuated by their peak. Without an obvious individuation criterion, coreference
decisions can become difﬁcult.
Consider the following sentences, taken from the T¨ uBa-D/Z corpus8:
(2) a. For a “barrier-free Bremen”, [1 several hundred disabled people] went
onto the streets yesterday — and demonstrated for “Equality, not Bar-
riers”.
b. “Why always us?” [2 the congregated] asked on the posters.
If we use both descriptions in isolation to delineate an extension for the group
entities that each mention refers to (taking a very literal approach of co-reference
as ﬁrst determining a real-world entity for each mention and then saying that they
co-refer if the two entities are the same), it is intuitively clear that the person groups
from mentions 1 and 2 must have a large overlap. But, seen in isolation, the real-
world extensions of the two mentions do not seem to be identical, as not every
demonstrator had disabilities, and neither did every one of them carry a poster with
the indicated question.
On the other hand, we would like to treat the demonstrators as one entity that is
described by several predications and not several distinct entities, just as we would
not want to talk about multiple clouds when there is just one cloud in the sky to
which several predicates apply differently on different parts.
If we treat the conditions of being disabled and of carrying posters as incidental
andinsteadusethedemonstratingasthedeﬁningpropertyofthecrowdofmentions
1 and 2, we can coerce the individual predicates of being disabled, and wanting
to push for a “barrier-free Bremen”, to (vague) predicates of groups by taking a
majority view. That is, the article talks about a crowd of demonstrators that
• wanted to push for a “barrier-free Bremen”
• comprised (about) several hundred people
• consisted (in a signiﬁcant proportion) of disabled people
• had some posters asking “Why always us?” (cumulative reading)
8Translated from T¨ uBa-D/Z; German original:
a. F¨ ur ein “barrierefreies Bremen” gingen deshalb gestern [1 mehrere hundert behinderte Menschen]
auf die Straße – und demonstrierten f¨ ur “Gleichstellung statt Barrieren”.
b. “Warum immer wir?” fragten [2 die Versammelten] deshalb auf Plakaten.
11This model is preferable on the grounds of being minimal: for two distinct en-
tities in the model, there is some information (either in the text or from background
knowledge) that distinguishes them, and it is preferable to talking about several
overlapping but not identical clouds.
But this also means that we have to ﬁrst build a model (including the merging
the ‘referential indices’ of coreferent mentions) and then interpret it, as opposed to
ﬁrst taking a relation of mentions to (real-world) entities and then judging coref-
erence on the equality of referents, which will lead to strange results. Conversely,
the model-ﬁrst approach that we want to advocate here weakens the idea of substi-
tutability of two textual descriptions to one of compatibility of a description with
somediscourseentity. Unlesswearereadytoadmitvagueness—multiplepossible
extensions for a group, even though the deﬁnite article suggest that the expression
has a unique denotation — we would have to deﬁne this compatibility in similar
terms than for substitutability, which would still be problematic.
The proposed model would have the denotations for the real-world entities to
shift in the process of incremental model-building that accompanies text compre-
hension, something which is not intuitive but, as we will argue, must be considered
a realistic assumption.
Toapplytheminimalmodelcriterion, westillneedtobeabletodiscusswhether
mergingtwoentitiesinthemodelwouldleadtoacontradiction(assumingcommon-
sense background assumptions), and it might be argued that allowing discourse en-
tities to be described by vague predicates lets the judgements on them, including
compatibility or mergeability, become vague, and possibly ambiguous.
To see that this is not the case, let us consider how the problem of vagueness
in reference is solved in Smith and Brogaard (2001)’s supervaluationist account of
reference to vague objects and predications of these objects. Smith and Brogaard
posit that you can, for a vague object, give multiple precisiﬁcations relevant to a
certain context – for a cloud, several cloud-shaped sets of water molecules, for a
crowd, multiple sets of persons, or, for a house that has an annex built besides it,
the house with or without the annex.
A statement is then judgeable and true (supertrue) iff we can instantiate ev-
ery singular term with a corresponding family of aggregates and that, however we
select a single possibility from the family of aggregates, the statement is true.
In our example, the predicates of having a certain political objective (by ex-
tension from the members to the crowd), to comprise several hundred people, to
consist (in a signiﬁcant proportion) of disabled people and of carrying some posters
(in a cumulative sense) are all vague, and not every precisiﬁcation of one predicate
is a plausible precisiﬁcation of another predicate. But if we use a conjunction of all
predicates (a straightforward way of interpreting this would be to take the intersec-
tion of the individual precisiﬁcations), we still get a plausible set of precisiﬁcations
for the whole description. Thus, we can instantiate the term that represents our ref-
erentinthemodelwithafamilyofprecisiﬁcationsthatmakesthewholedescription
judgeable and true (which is what we wanted in the ﬁrst place). The set of possible
precisiﬁcations for the joint descriptions would then be a subset of the precisiﬁca-
12tions for an individual mention, but the set of preferred precisiﬁcations could be
a different one, thus explaining a shift in the (vague) denotation in the course of
incremental model-building (where we ﬁrst have a description only based on the
ﬁrst mention, which is subsequently enrichted to include the information from the
second mention).
4.2 Reference in Blended Spaces
The account of vague extensions presented in the preceding section allows a clearer
view on disagreements between a markable being discourse-new and it being dis-
course-old (and coreferent to an earlier mention), by looking at plausible precisiﬁ-
cations for referents where an individuation criterion is not available.
Some other ambiguities are due to a richer structure of the mental model than
what can be represented as an equivalence relation. Annotating ambiguities would
not do justice to the model structure either, since some ambiguities can be related,
as in the following example9:
(3) a. As a lawyer in Boston, [1 John Travolta] sues two businesses that he
holds responsible for eight children having died of leukemia.
b. At ﬁrst, [2 the calculating career lawyer] only scents the high amount
of compensation (...).
c. A court drama, environmental thriller and great actors’ cinema, in
which [3 Travolta] and his antagonist Robert Duvall reach top form.
Markables 2 (the career lawyer), the lawyer ﬁgure from the story and 3 (Travolta),
the actor, are not compatible, since they mention two different entities. But mark-
able 1 mentions John Travolta in a context that obviously belongs to the career
lawyer. Annotating markable 2 and 3 as ambiguous between discourse-new and
coreferent to markable 1 would miss the point, since the interpretation where 2 and
3 are both discourse-new is not felicitous. In terms of the theory of mental spaces
(Fauconnier, 1984), we have two spaces, one with actors and one with the story’s
protagonists, and a third one where the two are blended together. Based on this
account, we can choose to consider the blended space for the equivalence relation
that we base coreference on.
The solution of using a blended space can also be cast in terms of the dot
objects described by Asher and Pustejovsky (2005): To explain the semantics of
sentences like “The book was a huge pain to lug home and turned out to be very
uninteresting”, where both the physical object and the book’s content are men-
tioned, or “Mary read the subway wall”, where an inference has to be made that
9example translated from T¨ uBa-D/Z corpus, sent. 3772ff;
German original:[1 John Travolta] verklagt als Bostoner Anwalt zwei Firmen, die er f¨ ur den
Leuk¨ amietod von acht Kindern verantwortlich macht.
Anfangs wittert [2 der berechnende Karriereanwalt] nur die hohe Entsch¨ adigungssumme (...).
Gerichtsdrama, Umweltthriller und großes Schauspielkino, in dem [3 Travolta] und sein Gegen-
spieler Robert Duvall zu Hochform auﬂaufen.
13yields an informational aspect of the subway wall, they introduce compositions
of primitive types; the book would then be modeled to be of the type physical •
informational, and would have as aspects both the physical object as well as the
information contained in it. Asher (2006) uses this to explain the felicity of sen-
tences like “Superman always gets more dates than Clark Kent does.” where the
usual denotation of Superman and Clark Kent would be a single individual. By
introducing aspectual objects for Superman as Superman and Superman as Clark
Kent (which behave differently with respect do having dates, depending on whether
Superman shows up in his Superman role or as Clark Kent) that are both aspects of
the (usual) person Superman.
For our purposes, we could represent the entities in the blended space as ac-
tor • role dot objects which have both an actor aspect (reach top form in a court
drama) and a ﬁctional person aspect (sue two businesses). The coreference annota-
tion would then consider this dot object (corresponding to an entity in the blended
space) as referent for the coreference chain. This solution fails when we have
multiple blended spaces for different ﬁlm adaptations of the same story, where we
would get multiple dot objects with the same role, but different actors, and there
would not be one preferred blended space. Such texts are rare enough not to be a
problem in practice, but they exist.10
4.3 Incompatible precisiﬁcations
In some cases, we ﬁnd that, on a coarse level of detail, some entity is repeatedly
mentioned and then taken up with an anaphoric mention, whereas on a ﬁner level
of detail, the repeated mentions are incompatible, creating a problem of referential
ambiguity11:
(4) a. The concepts range from a unilateral cessation of the air strikes (...)
to a politico-economic Marshall plan for [1 the whole Balkan].
b. At the beginning of the week, US ambassador Robert Barry has (...)
summarized his thoughts regarding a sustainable civil solution for [2
the permanent problem region of ex-Yugoslavia].
c. Barry demands (...) a restructuring of the development aid measures
in [3 the whole region].
10Consider the comparison of different adaptations of the Dickens novel “Great Expectations”,
found at http://www.victorianweb.org/authors/dickens/ge/ﬁlmadapt.html: whereas in one adaptation,
“Pip rips down the draperies of Satis House to let in the light of day upon the mould and decay
of Satis House and release Estella”, another is showing “Pip’s snobbery”, all while the reader is
perfectly comfortable with this over-abundance of blended spaces which would make coreference
annotation overly problematic.
11translated from T¨ uBa-D/Z sentences 6387,6389,6393;
German original: Die Konzepte reichen von einseitiger Einstellung der Luftangriffe (...) bis zu
einem politisch-wirtschaftlichen Marshallplan f¨ ur [1 den gesamten Balkan].
Zu Beginn der Woche hat US-Botschafter Robert Barry ...seine Gedanken zu einer nachhaltigen
zivilen L¨ osung f¨ ur [2 die Dauer-Problemregion Ex-Jugoslawien] zusammengefasst.
Barry fordert ...eine Umstrukturierung der Ausbauhilfen in [3 der gesamten Region].
14In this case, the theme is a plan by Robert Barry to stabilize the war-riddled region
around ex-Yugoslavia by means of targeted ﬁnancial aid. The exact region isn’t
speciﬁed – and probably the plan is not this detailed yet, so the region is vague and
its exact limits are underspeciﬁed. But the article mentions this region ﬁrst as “the
whole Balkan”, and then as “the (...) region of ex-Yugoslavia”, which are both
plausible extensions of this region but not compatible with each other. As a result,
one annotator marked markable 1 as coreferent with “the whole region”, while the
other chose markable 2.
A precondition for this anaphoric reference to a vague entity to be felicitous
would be that the reader does not notice the incompatibility between the two previ-
ous mentions. From a production perspective, we could argue that the vague entity
that the author had in mind was coerced to a more speciﬁc one (by the unavailabil-
ity of more basic terms for the vague region); from a comprehension perspective,
the construction-integration model of Kintsch and van Dijk (1978) would predict
that some facts from the discourse get simpliﬁed in the process of understanding
(the sentences have some text between them), and it would be plausible that the
more speciﬁc representations of “the whole Balkan” and “the (...) region of ex-
Yugoslavia” are reduced to the underlying vague representation that we posit here.
We can formalise this by saying that the mentions evoke both an entity from
a space with precise representations, and one from a space with coarser repre-
sentations, yielding a composite object with a vague and a precise aspect (where
the vague aspect is needed for the structuring/comprehension of discourse) – this
would not help us immediately for possible solutions since the precise aspect could
be referred to in a different context (consider a similar text where “the (...) region
of ex-Yugoslavia” is followed by mentions of ex-Yugoslavia that elaborate on other
propositions and thus don’t have the vague region aspect that the ﬁrst mention has).
But we gain at least some explanatory adequacy by the use of this device since we
can then argue about the presence of the additional aspect pertaining to a coarser
frame of reference.
Positing dot objects with aspects for different levels of granularity (which
would correspond to the ‘local’ theories of different granularity levels, as posited
by Hobbs, 1985) would provide an insight into other cases of coreference with two
incompatible (potential) antecedents, as in the following example from (Knees,
2006)12:
(5) a. It was Robert Jackson’s will that this should not remain an isolated
case; [Atthattimealready, hedemandedthatanInternationalCriminal
Court should be established].
b. He wanted to take advantage of the favourable moment as the world
was shocked by the atrocities of the Nazis, the full enormity of which
could only be anticipated ﬁrst at [Nuremberg]. (...)
c. But an International Criminal Court only starts gradually to take shape
12translated from the German original version containing the pronominal adverb danach
15today, 50 years after [that], in The Hague, where the war crimes of the
former Yugoslavia are being dealt with.
Both the Nuremberg trials and Jackson’s demanding are plausible antecedents for
the anaphoric “after that”, but they are obviously not compatible. We can model
thisbypositingacoarsergranularitylevel(sincetheanchoringdescription50years
after that is coarser than the granularity of the anchoring events the Nuremberg
trials and Jackson’s demanding) and saying that the anchoring description coerces
the antecedent descriptions to a coarser granularity.
Knees remarks that this could be an example for the Justiﬁed Sloppiness Hy-
pothesis brought forth in (Poesio et al., 2003), which was motivated by exam-
ples like the following, which Poesio and Reyle (2001) found in their study of the
TRAINS corpus:
(6) a. Hook up [engine E2] to [the boxcar] at Elmira.
b. And send [it] to Corning as soon as possible.
c. As soon as it arrives, [it] should be ﬁlled with oranges.
In this case, annotators disagreed whether the pronoun “it” was referring to the
boxcar or the engine. Poesio and Reyle argue that the pronoun (in b) could be seen
as referring either to the boxcar, the engine or the whole train (as the mereolog-
ical sum of both), and argue that a theory of discourse might leave the pronoun
interpretation under-speciﬁed between all three solutions. In a case like the above
including (c), the under-speciﬁcation gets fully speciﬁed later (in c), since only
boxcars can be ﬁlled with oranges.
Poesio et al. account for this phenomenon with the hypothesis that ambiguity
between multiple potential antecedents can occur without being rejected as being
ungrammatical (which would certainly occur in the case of an ambiguity that al-
lows for different scenario interpretations, a case where we would see repairs in
dialogue or largely negative judgements in a magnitude estimation study), as long
as the following conditions are met:
1. Both explicitly mentioned potential antecedents x and y are elements of an
underlying mereological structure with summum σ = x⊕y which has been
explicitly constructed (and made salient) in the dialogue.
2. theexistenceofthisstructuremakesitpossibletoconstructap-underspeciﬁed
interpretation in which the anaphoric expression is interpreted as denoting an
element z included in the mereological structure – i.e. part-of its summum
σ:
[xy σ z | ...σ = x ⊕ y, z ∗ σ ...]
3. All possible interpretations (x, y, z, x ⊕ y) are equivalent for the purposes
of the plan.
16Assuming a mereological hierarchy like that of Reitsma and Bittner (2003)13,
the Justiﬁed Sloppiness Hypothesis provides a good explanation for examples like
(5) and (6). However, we could not use the Justiﬁed Sloppiness Hypothesis to
explain our earlier example (4) since the precisiﬁcations are not mereological parts
of the vague region; also, the reference to mereological structure could be seen as
somewhat arbitrary.
In our model, the trains example would be explained by the fact that “send ?
to Corning” selects for a train and thus triggers the dot-introduction, leading to a
boxcar • train object where only the train aspect is used. Since the other aspect
is not used, we can then posit underspeciﬁcation between a boxcar • train and
a engine • train entity as referent for the “it” in (b). The mereological structure
then serves to fulﬁll the precondition for the introduction of dot objects, but is not
special otherwise.
We can formalise this extension of Poesio et al.’s Justiﬁed Sloppiness Hypoth-
esis as the following Generalised Sloppiness Hypothesis:
Multiple potential antecedents can occur without being rejected as ungrammat-
ical as long as
1. The anaphoric expression occurs as argument to a predicate P : β −◦t, i.e.
the context selects for a type β.
2. The potential antecedents x : α1, y : α2 have to be extended to a β-
compatible complex type (i.e., α1 • β or α2 • β).
3. In both cases, the same entity z : β is selected as result of the dot introduc-
tion.
The notion of dot objects allows us to treat blended spaces, granularity shifts,
and cases of polysemy in a uniform way, much like Mani’s (1998) treatment of
granularity shifts and polysemy using abstraction operators, and it possibly allows
us to treat a greater bandwith of phenomena than with Poesio et al’s original for-
mulation.
It is also possible to predict the acceptability (or, in Poesio’s terms, justiﬁca-
tion) of such examples as resulting of (i) the plausibility of a coercion from α1/2
to β as a result of the context (P) and (ii) the interference from a reading without
coercion which would make the example unacceptable.
The difference between coercibility criteria and Poesio et al.’s formulation us-
ing plans would be visible in a hypothetical case where the plan is to blow up both
the engine and the boxcar by joining them together and planting a bomb on them:
13Link (1983)’s original version contained two hierarchies, one of atomic objects and plurals com-
posed of several atomic objects, and one of unstructured lumps, connected by an extension function
that maps (groups of) atoms to the lump that is their material extension. Since σ is not a plural
and not a simple sum of extensions (as in “the material making up John’s left hand and the Empire
State Building”), we need to posit a (possibly domain-speciﬁc) mereology of functional or otherwise
salient parts and wholes.
17(7) a. Hook up [engine E2] to [the boxcar] at Elmira.
b. Attach a large bomb to [it] and blow it up.
For the purposes of the plan, it is not important whether the bomb is planted on the
engine, the boxcar or the train (assuming that the bomb is large enough), but the
predicate of ‘attaching a bomb to something’ does not require its argument to be
a train, and no dot introduction is involved. Our Generalized Sloppiness criterion
would thus (correctly) predict that (7)b is awkward.
5 Possible treatments for referential ambiguity
As seen in the preceding sections, referential ambiguity is a problem that also oc-
curs in the written texts that are used for large-scale coreference annotation. We
think that some (pre-theoretic) notions used to model or to explain coreference
contribute to the resulting problems.
Coreference is usually modeled as an equivalence relation between entities on
the text surface, deﬁned by the entities they refer to. In fact, this makes it easy
to subsume anaphora under coreference, because of substitutability: being able to
replace the anaphor with its antecedent would then ensure both its antecedenthood
and the coreference to the anaphor. Substitutability, and the other criteria, are
obviously met when we consider the case of a discrete set of entities coming from
a single, ﬁxed frame of reference (e.g., in the case of most named entities), or most
cases of pronominal anaphora.
Already van Deemter and Kibble (2000) raise objections against the conﬂation
of anaphora and coreference, using (non-)substitutability of quantiﬁed expressions
with further pronominal mentions. If we use coindexation instead of reference to
real-world entities and are aware of quantiﬁcation, van Deemter and Kibble’s point
seems much less critical; but the examples in sections 4.1 and 4.2 show that na¨ ıve
substitutability is indeed not a good criterion for judging coreference. Accordingly,
the notion of model building (or mental models more generally) should be seen
as more primitive than the notion of reference (especially to the real world) for
purposes such as a deﬁnition of coreference. We can use this insight to explain
why substitutability does not hold in these examples — citing properties of vague
referents, or of blended spaces — and get alternative criteria for these cases.
In the case of an actor and his role being interchangeably used for each other,
for example, it is possible to consider complex actor/role entities that Fauconnier’s
theory of mental spaces would predict to occur in a blended space – it then be-
comes possible to annotate these as equivalent descriptions even though they are
not substitutable in the stricter sense. In the cases of sloppy reference discussed in
the last subsection, the more complex account of reference to entities in the mental
model helps to understand the ambiguity problem in terms of coercion (one de-
scription evokes several entities from the mental model), but does not lead to an
obvious solution by itself.
18Some researchers argue that the best solution to ambiguity problems is not to
care at all, but leave contradictory judgements of annotators in the gold standard
if both versions are plausible. This has actually been proposed by Strassel et al.
(2004) for the ACE annotation effort, with the argument that the desire to always
specify one single alternative as the right one leads to both increased cost and un-
necessarilybloatedmanuals. Thismaybeﬁneiftheannotatedcorpusisjustusedas
training or evaluation material for automatic classiﬁcation or tagging, since it leads
to evaluation scores that are somewhat closer to what people expect (i.e. fewer peo-
ple will be discontent because their system has tagged what they think is the right
solution, but the gold standard has been annotated differently). But if we wanted
to take this at face value and say that we are really annotating the ambiguities in
the corpus, we would be simply wrong. If two annotators agree, this is not a safe
sign that a third annotator would not come up with a totally new solution, and if
they disagree, we cannot be sure that one of the solutions isn’t just marginal and
would be annotated differently by the same annotator on a different day. While the
original (and ambiguous) annotations are interesting as raw material, they fail to
meet the predictability criterion almost as badly as a version annotated by only a
single annotator would.
Poesio et al. (2006) go a step further and propose annotating ambiguities. In
an experiment with 18 annotators annotating the same texts, they speciﬁcally en-
couraged annotators to annotate ambiguities. They found perfect or near-perfect
agreement for 53% (79 out of 148) of the markables, and of the 67 markables that
were implicitly ambiguous (i.e. more than one possibility chosen by more than two
annotators), 38 were marked as ambiguous by at least one annotator (24 by at least
two). While these results can be called quite encouraging, they also show that an-
notators are not really good at spotting ambiguities – in average, each coder that
marked any items at all (three did not annotate any ambiguities) marked a little less
than 9 markables. Arguably, better annotator training and the reﬁnement of the
ambiguous annotation in the revision process would improve this somewhat. But
this kind of second-order ambiguity (between an ambiguous and an unambiguous
annotation) means that annotators must be able to reliably distinguish ambiguities
(due to sloppy reference) from misunderstandings or errors, a problem which be-
comes more acute when annotation is cast as a collaborative process to catch a
maximum of ambiguities.14 In the case of multiple mental spaces (such as in ex-
ample 3), locally annotating ambiguities would also miss an important point since
the ambiguities are indicative of the underlying structure. On the other hand, we
almost certainly do not want to annotate all the structure that the theory of men-
tal spaces predicts, since the predictions of this theory become unreliable in other
aspects.
A sensible solution for this might be to try to minimize both annotated ambi-
guity and also the structure beyond local ambiguities that is annotated: In cases
where a preferred mapping between sets of textual entities and discourse referents
14Poesio (p.c.) mentions that this will be done in an upcoming project called AnaWiki
19(corresponding to a minimal model) can be constructed, as in examples 2 and 3,
this should be annotated as unambiguous coreference, even though it violates sub-
stitutability; a light-weight theory such as the one sketched in this article helps
distinguish these cases from real ambiguities even when substitutability does not
hold. In cases which cannot be made unambiguous, such as the examples from sub-
section 4.3, annotation of ambiguities can then be used, as we hope, with greater
reliability.
In most annotation projects, however, the overhead of explicitly annotating am-
biguities will mean that a solution will be sought that results in an unambiguous
annotation in all cases. This is still possible by explicitly stating preference rules
such as those used by Chiarcos and Krasavina (2005). For example, their anno-
tation guidelines include a rule to mark pronouns that are ambiguous between an
idiomatic reading and an anaphoric reading should be marked as coreferent with
their (potential) antecedent, but also marked as ambiguous. To extend this treat-
ment to cases of referential ambiguity, and make one possible interpretation part of
the ofﬁcial/formal gold standard annotation (thus ensuring theory-neutrality since
we do not commit ourselves to annotate structures that only make sense within a
given theory; information on ambiguities would be left as an informal part of the
annotation to be exploited when revising the treebank or by researchers speciﬁ-
cally interested in the ambiguities), it is necessary to provide meaningful criteria
that allow for (i) a consistent identiﬁcation of ambiguous cases and (ii) in the more
complicated cases where the ambiguity is between several (otherwise plausible,
but incompatible) coreference links, allow the selection of one of the alternatives.
These criteria will have to be formulated using concepts from a ‘lightweight the-
ory’ that can be used to analyse more complex cases and relates to full theories of
reference where appropriate.
This kind of theory-neutral, theory-guided annotation can also provide a possi-
ble (partial) solution for manual bloat: because we essentially rely on existing the-
oretical frameworks, we only need the mapping from (ﬁner) structures predicted by
the theory to (coarser) equivalence relations in our coreference scheme, and not a
full explanation of ad-hoc decisions (or possibly, partial generalizations of ad-hoc
decisions).
6 Conclusion
After describing the beneﬁts of creating large annotated corpora, we argued for
the necessity for iterative improvement of the annotation and its documentation,
backed by a light-weight theory that helps ensure the consistency of the annota-
tion, to eventually obtain the highest quality possible. We also demonstrated the
use of per-class agreement measures as a tool for post-hoc quantitative investiga-
tion of annotation problems. Using such an investigation, we could demonstrate
that (plural-marked) groups of persons exhibit a much higher error rate than (sin-
gular) persons and organizations (which could be seen as a formally constituted
20group of persons). This is worth noting since, even when limiting coreference
annotation to persons in an attempt to eliminate problematic cases, we would get
similar problems for groups of persons as for events, since both are vague referents.
With an appropriate theory, in our case a combination of Karttunen’s idea
of discourse referents together with Smith and Brogaard’s account of referential
vagueness, we argue, one can make a principled argument that allows for con-
sistent decisions in many cases. However, there are ambiguities that cannot be
resolved due to several referents (vague or not) being plausible antecedents for an
anaphoric description or pronoun. Poesio et al. (2003) propose an account based
on their Justiﬁed Sloppiness Hypothesis that covers some of these cases. With a
reformulation of this hypothesis into what we call the Generalized Sloppiness Hy-
pothesis, we are able to cast the problem in terms of coercion, treating granularity
shifts and structural polysemy similarly, and are able to explain some cases of am-
biguity that the original version did not, and we hope that using the notion of dot
objects introduced by coercion and granularity shifts will be generally helpful for
discussing problems in coreference annotation.
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